MV#5 — QBism: The World is Unfinished — Ruediger Schack

Quantum mechanics is a powerful tool. It allows us to manipulate matter and make predictions with unparalleled precision. But we typically ask more of our theories than instrumental capabilities, we’d like them to give us an account of nature. 

In order to extract such an account from quantum mechanics we need to confront the measurement problem. A specific, and famous instance of this problem can be served up like so:

  1. A cat in a box can be in states of being alive and dead simultaneously …
  2. …  until opening the box to observe the cat causes one state to be picked. 

Neither portion of this is palatable. With David Wallace, we have previously discussed the Everett interpretation which disputes the first and emphatically denies the second. According to this view, the world branches at events causing macroscopic things (like cats) to develop into superpositions of very different states (like the superposition of being dead and alive). To Everettians there is not one cat that is alive and dead. The live and dead are plural: the cats exist in different branches of a multiverse, they are counterpart cats inhabiting counterpart boxes. Observation tells us the branch we are in but has no privileged role. 

Our guest this week is Ruediger Schack. With Chris Fuchs and Carlton Caves, Ruediger is one of the originators of a very different framework for understanding quantum mechanics, QBism. He’s a professor of mathematics at Royal Holloway, University of London working in the fields of Quantum Information and cryptography.

Under the QBist view cats can be in quantum states of being alive and dead simultaneously and agents can provoke a collapse in the quantum state. Yet, to the QBist none of this is mysterious for under this interpretation the quantum state does not represent the world it represents our knowledge. To use some philosophical terms of art quantum states are epistemic and not ontic.

The original label for the QBist account was Quantum Bayesianism, which captured the notion that the collapse of the wavefunction is nothing more than Bayesian updating — the wavefunction is a representation of a user’s beliefs, as new evidence emerges it is trivial that this should change discontinuously. 

The QBist project has outgrown its original label of Quantum Bayesianism, it has some fascinating features, at the core of which is that agents cannot be removed from reality. Reality is not, according to the QBists, independent of agents, it is not objective. But neither is it purely ideal — Berkleyan — nor dependent on one individual. Rather it is inter-subjective.

This swims against a strong current in Western science and philosophy within the analytic tradition where a “God’s eye view” (or, another term of art, sub specie aeternitatis) is accepted as conceptually meaningful. But within other philosophical traditions — specifically phenomenology — it does receive support. It was perhaps the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty who most captured the QBist spirit when he wrote:

“there is no world without a being in the world”

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Merleau-Ponty implies that there is an external world, but it is dependent on the beings within it, just as they depend on it for their situation. 

Another interesting facet of QBism is its use of a personalist Bayesian interpretation of probability, so all probabilities are degrees of belief — even 0 and 1. This enables their rejection of the EPR criterion of reality introduced by Einstein, Podolosky, and Rosen:

If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality corresponding to that quantity.

From Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete? — Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen

The intuition here is that for cases where we can perfectly predict the position that (for example) a particle will be in when observed, it was in that position — whether observed or not. 

The QBist replies: why should a person’s subjective beliefs imply the existence of any element of reality? 

We dig a little into some of the challenges for the QBist — including the above. Harvey Brown outlines arguments for the reality of the wavefunction which go against the core QBist belief that quantum states are epistemic. The spirit of these arguments is thqt quantum states fundamental to the explanatory power of quantum mechanics, and that the best explanation of this is that they exist. This is the fundamental abductive argument that underpins much scientific thinking — it’s why we think particles are real.

I find it illuminating to contrast the hyper-realist view offered by the Many Worlds (or Everett) interpretation of quantum mechanics where quantum states and their evolution capture all of reality with the QBist for whom they are not an element of nature at all. 

While I still count myself as a card-carrying Everettian this was an eye-opening excursion down another path of thinking. I particularly enjoyed Ruediger’s closing thoughts — because agents cannot be removed from the QBist picture, reality is not fully defined, it is being created by us. The world is not finished. 

References

Ruediger’s article on QBism in The Conversation

Wikipedia and The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy offer good introductions to QBism.

A QBist reads Merleau-Ponty — Ruediger discusses the parallels between QBism and phenomenology

The Reality of the Wavefunction: Old Arguments and New — Harvey Brown’s paper reasoning that QBism fails to capture the explanatory power of the wavefunction

“Was There a Sun Before Men Existed?”: A. J. Ayer and French Philosophy in the Fifties — an entertaining paper by Andreas Vrahimis that contrasts the thinking of phenomenologists and the analytic philosopher A.J. Ayer.

Chris Timpson is always worth listening to on the subject of the interpretations of QM, a self-described agnostic on this topic his discussion of QBism gives a characteristically thoughtful and even-handed critique. Here he is on YouTube

Chris Fuchs is a pleasure to listen to, even if one disagrees, his characterization of the philosophical critiques of QBism is irresistibly brilliant: “wah, wah, wah you’re not realist enough for us”. From this talk on YouTube.

MV#2 — The Emergent Multiverse — David Wallace

“When you come to a fork in the road, you should take it”

So goes the jocular advice of Yogi Berra.

But what if this is what the universe actually does? What if we live in a garden of forking paths, of events that can go one way or another and in fact do both?

This is the subject of today’s podcast with David Wallace. David holds the Mellon Chair in Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He is one of the leading advocates of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Originally proposed in 1957 by Hugh Everett and also called the Many Worlds Interpretation it offers a way of unpacking the precise mathematical predictions of this theory. 

The issue is this: quantum mechanics permits small things — atoms, electrons, photons — to be in frankly weird states. A single particle can be in many places at once, or traveling at many different speeds. 

These superpositions are key to Quantum Mechanics. Integral to this theory which explains how stars work, has enabled us to build computer chips and, indeed, lies at the very foundations of our understanding of matter — the uninspiringly named “Standard Model” is a quantum mechanical theory. 

Perhaps you have no issue with these tiny particles being in such weird states — you can’t see them. But quantum mechanics does not draw a qualitative distinction between small and big things. Like the rest of physics, it treats big things as agglomerations of small ones, the difference between them is of quantity, not kind. So quantum mechanics appears to tell us that big things like people, or (famously) cats can be in multiple places at once or even in seemingly contradictory states of being dead and alive. This is not what we observe.

The original attempt to explain this away was to say that when a measurement takes place these superpositions break down and crystallise into a single state. You might have come across phrases like “the collapse of the wavefunction” to describe this idea that things go from being spread out, or wavelike, to being localised. But what’s so special about measurement that it should provoke such a change of behaviour, what even is measurement if not just another physical process?

Other attempts propose modifying quantum mechanics — adding a new mechanism that would cause the crystallisation or collapse that doesn’t privilege measurement. However, it is no mean feat to try to modify a theory that has had such predictive success.

But what if we do not try to explain anything away?

What if we take seriously this idea of superpositions at all levels, not just the microscopic but all the way up to human and even universal scale?

Does quantum mechanics actually tell us we will observe something being in two states at once? No. Hugh Everett, David Wallace, and many others reason that quantum mechanics tells us that the world branches and that as the small superpositions become large those large ones represent worlds and each world looks much like the world we inhabit — where objects are one thing or another but never both at once.

When a photon can follow two different paths, it does, when the detection apparatus can observe it in two different places it will, when I can see that apparatus registering two different things, I will. But there is one me, and another me and neither sees anything extraordinary. The world has followed the fork in the road.

This is a theory with almost incredible consequences. But it has unassuming origins. It does not assume that there is anything special about measurement nor that quantum mechanics is incomplete. It is a radical theory for it goes to the roots of quantum mechanics, from these the branches emerge.

David was my tutor when I studied Physics and Philosophy as an undergraduate at Oxford, my thanks to him for giving his time to my curiosity once again.

References

The Yogi Berra line is one Harvey Brown used in his lectures on MWI.